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On March 13–14, 2006, a meeting on anthrax, sponsored by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) in collaboration with the Southeastern Center for Emerging Biologic
Threats, was held at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. The meeting’s agenda
included discussion of postexposure prophylaxis (PEP), screening and evaluation, and
treatment of the various manifestations of human anthrax. The goal was to convene subject
matter experts for a review of research developments and clinical experience with anthrax
prophylaxis and treatment and to make consensus recommendations for updating guidelines
for PEP, treatment, and clinical evaluation of patients with anthrax. A 2001 conference on
guidelines for anthrax has previously been summarized in this journal (1). This article
summarizes the meeting’s presentations and discussion. Consensus recommendations are
summarized in the Table(https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/content/14/4/e1-t1.htm). Updated CDC
guidelines for treatment and prophylaxis of anthrax will be published in detail in other CDC
publications and are available on CDC’s website at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/index.asp.
Participants included representatives and members of academic research and clinical
institutions, the Health Protection Agency of the United Kingdom, the Health Protection
Agency and Armed Forces of Canada, the US Department of Defense, the US Department of
Homeland Security, the US Department of Health and Human Services Office of Research
and Development Coordination, the Food and Drug Administration, the National Institutes of
Health, the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, the American Board of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the Infectious Diseases Society of America, and CDC
(Figure). Among these participants were researchers, health department personnel, and
clinicians, including the Pennsylvania pulmonologist who treated the 2006 case of inhalation
anthrax (IA), the first naturally occurring case of IA in the United States since 1976 (2).
PEP for Inhalation Anthrax
During the 2001 US outbreak of bioterrorism-related anthrax, 22 confirmed or suspected
anthrax cases occurred after envelopes containing Bacillus anthracis spores in powder were
sent through the mail (3). Approximately 10,000 persons were offered at least 60 days of
antimicrobial PEP (4). Current CDC recommendations for PEP following potential inhalation
exposure to aerosolized B. anthracis spores are 60 days of oral antimicrobial therapy in
combination with a 3-dose series of anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA), BioThrax (BioPort
Corporation, Lansing, MI, USA) administered at time zero, 2 weeks, and 4 weeks (5,6). AVA is
not FDA-approved for PEP and therefore would be available under an Investigational New
Drug (IND) protocol.
Antimicrobial Agent Selection
Selection of the antimicrobial agent for PEP should involve consideration of antimicrobial
resistance. Variable β-lactam resistance, particularly to the cephalosporins, has been
reported among naturally occurring B. anthracis isolates (7–9). β-lactamase genes have been
identified in the B. anthracis chromosome (10,11), and evaluation of isolates from the 2001
event indicated the presence of both cephalosporinase and penicillinase enzymes (12).
Additionally, resistance can be readily induced in vitro in B. anthracis to a variety of
antimicrobial classes including fluoroquinolones, tetracyclines, macrolides, penicillins, and
other β-lactams (8,13–16).
Ciprofloxacin, doxycycline, and penicillin G procaine have demonstrated efficacy for PEP in a
nonhuman primate model (17) and are FDA-approved for “inhalational anthrax
(postexposure)” in all age groups (18). Meeting participants reiterated existing CDC
recommendations for ciprofloxacin and doxycycline as equivalent first-line antimicrobial
agents for PEP, as they are equally efficacious for PEP and have similar susceptibility profiles
among naturally occurring isolates (9,17). Both have similar safety profiles, with a low rate of
anaphylactic reactions (19,20). Following the bioterrorism event of 2001, there were no
differences in self-reported symptoms with use of either drug for PEP, and no serious adverse
events could be definitely related to their use (21).
Levofloxacin is FDA-approved for “inhalational anthrax (postexposure)” in adults 18 years of
age and older (22). There are safety data for up to 28 days of use, but safety data on
extended use up to 60 days are limited (22). Therefore, levofloxacin is recommended as a
second-line PEP antimicrobial agent, to be reserved for instances where medical issues may
call for its use.
Penicillins should not be initially used for PEP of anthrax, due to concern for penicillin
resistance, which has been found in naturally occurring isolates, and because of the low
concentrations achieved with oral penicillins in pulmonary secretions, tissue, and within
alveolar macrophages (23,24). Amoxicillin can be used for PEP once the B. anthracis strain
has been proven penicillin susceptible, when other antimicrobial agents are not considered
safe to use, such as for pediatric patients and for nursing or pregnant women. However,
amoxicillin is not FDA-approved for this indication, and this use is considered “off-label.”
Therefore, amoxicillin use for PEP in a mass-exposure event might be provided under an IND
or under an Emergency Use Authorization in a declared emergency. Amoxicillin use for PEP is
discussed further in the section below on special populations. Other antimicrobial agents,
including clindamycin, chloramphenicol, rifampin, vancomycin, and other fluoroquinolones,
may be considered for off-label use in patients unable to tolerate FDA-approved antimicrobial
agents for PEP.
Duration of Prophylaxis Regimen
The PEP antimicrobial regimen should remain for 60 days, combined with 3 doses of AVA.
This duration is supported by data from the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak (25): illness up
to 58 days following inhalation exposure to anthrax in nonhuman primates receiving
antibiotics alone for 30 days (17), and demonstrated efficacy of the PEP combination of
antimicrobial therapy and vaccination with AVA (17).
Participants discussed whether a shortened course of antimicrobial therapy plus a 3-dose
AVA series would be effective, based on recent nonhuman primate research of a successful
14-day PEP course of ciprofloxacin combined with 3 AVA doses, and demonstrated immune
response to AVA (26), and on evidence of seroconversion among clinical trial participants
following 3 doses of AVA (27). However, there are no well-defined serologic correlates of
protection to demonstrate that AVA vaccination has conferred adequate protective immunity
in a person receiving PEP. Additionally, there are no human clinical trial data supporting any
reduction in the duration of antimicrobial PEP, and there are isolated AVA study participants
who have failed to seroconvert following vaccination (CDC, unpub. data). Therefore, it was
deemed prudent to maintain the recommended 60-day course of antimicrobial therapy
combined with the 3-dose AVA series to ensure adequate protection for all persons requiring
PEP after aerosolized B. anthracis exposure.
Clinical Screening and Evaluation of Inhalation Anthrax
Since 2001, when CDC guidelines for the clinical evaluation of patients with possible IA in the
event of possible mass exposure were published in the MMWR (28), several alternative
screening algorithms have been suggested including the Inova Fairfax protocol proposed by
Mayer et al (29), and the 3-tier screening protocol from Hupert et al (30).
The goal of all IA screening algorithms should be to evaluate large numbers of patients
seeking treatment in emergency departments and identify potential IA cases: 1) during a
potential or confirmed mass event; 2) when there is a known threat or epidemiologic data
suggesting an increased risk for anthrax; or 3) when there is clinical suspicion of anthrax
based on symptoms consistent with IA, including fever and persistent tachycardia, among
others (28,29). The low sensitivity and specificity of such screening algorithms may not detect
an isolated IA case; therefore, these algorithms are not meant to serve as general guidance
for identifying IA without appropriate epidemiologic or clinical data. For example, neither the
original CDC guidelines nor the proposed Inova Fairfax guidelines would have detected the
solitary 2006 IA case (2). Nor should IA screening algorithms replace existing emergency
department (ED) screening guidelines for patients with symptoms of community-acquired
pneumonia (CAP); routine CAP cases are likely to be selected as potential IA cases when
using these algorithms; additional diagnostics will be required to rule out IA.
Mayer et al retrospectively evaluated CDC’s screening guidelines, using the 11 IA cases from
2001 included among an ED patient population from the same period. On the basis of their
analysis, they proposed revised screening guidelines. CDC guidelines successfully identified
only 1 of the 11 cases, whereas the Inova Fairfax algorithm modified from CDC guidelines
successfully identified 9 of the 11 cases (29). Participants debated whether the
recommendation to reduce the number of clinical symptoms required by the Inova Fairfax
guidelines warranted further evaluation (Table(https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/content/14/4/e1-
t1.htm)) because IA case-patients who seek treatment early in the course of the disease
could be missed as they may not yet have all of the required symptoms. Including fever and
tachycardia as necessary symptoms to begin the algorithm, timing public health notification,
and reducing the stringency of the requirement for an epidemiologic link were discussed.
Participants agreed that elements of the Inova Fairfax protocol should be incorporated into
future CDC-recommended screening algorithms. They further recommended that validation
studies be conducted and feedback collected to determine the accuracy and effectiveness of
the algorithm in identifying cases of IA in an outbreak setting.
Hupert et al proposed a 3-tier screening protocol to identify potential early IA case-patients in
the setting of a large-scale anthrax exposure, to aid ED physicians in decisions regarding
PEP, and to support the clinical treatment decision process (30). Participants agreed that
such a large-scale screening algorithm for persons with potential aerosol exposure to anthrax
in a mass exposure setting should be addressed in CDC’s guidelines; however, such an
algorithm was not adequately validated for adoption as a CDC recommendation.
Clinicians considering IA as a differential diagnosis should alert hospital microbiology staff of
their suspicions and obtain blood cultures as early as possible before antimicrobial treatment.
Gram-stain analyses of blood samples have previously detected bacteremia in systemic
anthrax cases and in animal models (31,32) and may be informative.
Thoracic imaging remains a critical tool for the diagnosis of IA. Thoracic imaging studies were
abnormal in all 11 of the IA cases from 2001 (8/11 with widened mediastinum, 9/11 with
pleural effusions, and 7/11 with pulmonary infiltrates). However, initial ED thoracic
radiographs may not reveal the classic widened mediastinum described for IA in all cases
(33,34). In severe IA cases, thoracic computerized tomography without contrast was
suggested as having utility for viewing hemorrhagic mediastinal lymph nodes.
Sensitivity and specificity analyses were recommended for evaluating any proposed IA
screening algorithms, using historical IA cases incorporated into ED populations from annual
influenza seasons or other periods with increased numbers of respiratory illness cases.
Neither current CDC nor proposed alternative guidelines are applicable for pediatric patients
because of lack of data on pediatric IA cases. Participants called for development of
screening guidelines for children in collaboration with the American Association of Pediatrics
and other pediatric care partners.
Treatment of Severe Disease, including Inhalation and Gastrointestinal Anthrax, Anthrax Meningitis,
and Bacteremia
Current CDC recommendations for the treatment of anthrax were published in October 2001
specifically for cases resulting from the 2001 anthrax bioterrorist attack. After presentations
on the clinical course of IA cases from 2001 and 2006 and discussion of the limited treatment
success of IA cases from 2001 (5/11 patients died despite aggressive therapy), participants
recommended revision of CDC treatment protocols for IA and serious systemic illness from
anthrax.
Clinical or subclinical meningitis in patients with IA is likely. Meningitis is reported with all 3
clinical forms of anthrax and likely results from hematogenous spread across the blood-brain
barrier when bacteremia is present. During the 2001 outbreak, although only 1 of the 11 IA
case-patients had meningitis, 4 others had symptoms suggesting meningeal involvement.
Confirmation of meningitis was not obtained in these 4 case-patients, and cerebrospinal fluid
was not examined in all patients. If these 4 case-patients did have subclinical or early
meningitis, then 45% of the 2001 IA case-patients had meningeal involvement (33).
Additionally, hemorrhagic leptomeningitis was reported from autopsies in 21 (50%) of 42 IA
fatalities from the 1979 Sverdlovsk outbreak (35); meningoencephalitis was reported in 44%
of fatal cases in a review of 82 IA cases from 1900 to 2005 (including the 11 bioterrorism
(BT)-related cases from 2001) (34). Furthermore, IA studies of nonhuman primates have
demonstrated meningeal involvement in up to 77% of experimental animal cases (32).
Therefore, meningeal involvement should be suspected in IA or other cases of systemic
anthrax.
For treatment of anthrax cases with severe systemic or life-threatening disease (including IA
and gastrointestinal anthrax), and for cases with fulminant bacteremia, IV ciprofloxacin is
recommended over doxycycline as the primary antimicrobial agent unless ciprofloxacin use is
contraindicated (fluoroquinolones are bactericidal while tetracyclines are bacteriostatic).
Additionally, because meningeal involvement is likely in systemic anthrax cases, ciprofloxacin
is theoretically favored over doxycycline; central nervous system (CNS) penetration of
ciprofloxacin in the presence of meningeal inflammation is much higher than the poor CNS
penetration of doxycycline (31). Although ciprofloxacin is the only fluoroquinolone for which
data are available, other fluoroquinolones with similar spectrums of activity and CNS
penetration may also be appropriate.
At least 1 or more additional agents with adequate CNS penetration and in vitro activity
against B. anthracis (e.g., ampicillin or penicillin, meropenem, rifampin, or vancomycin)
should be used in the treatment of systemic cases of anthrax regardless of clinical suspicion
of meningeal involvement. Clindamycin is strongly recommended for inclusion in the
antimicrobial regimen because of its ability to inhibit protein synthesis, which may reduce
exotoxin production. Participants recommended continuing the current 60-day course of
antimicrobial therapy, with adjustment of the regimen based on the clinical course of the
disease in the patient (36). The use of corticosteroids as an adjunct to antimicrobial therapy
may benefit patients with anthrax meningitis (31); however, with no efficacy data from
controlled clinical trials, this adjunctive treatment may be of no benefit for toxin-mediated
tissue edema.
Early and aggressive pleural fluid drainage is recommended for all IA case-patients and is
consistent with the standard of care for empyema or complicated pneumonia. This
recommendation is based on the experience that chest tubes or early serial drainage of
pleural effusions seemed to be beneficial in the successful clinical therapy of the surviving IA
patients in 2001 and in the recent 2006 IA case (2,33). Evaluation of the treatment of IA cases
from 1900 to 2005 showed pleural fluid drainage to be significantly associated with
decreased mortality (34). Analysis of serial pleural fluid samples from the 2006 IA case
showed high pleural fluid lethal toxin levels. The positive outcome of this case likely resulted
from a combination of the mechanical effects on respiration from fluid drainage and the
reduction in lethal toxin levels by removing pleural effusions (2).
Treatment of Cutaneous Anthrax
Treatment with oral ciprofloxacin or doxycycline for 7–10 days is recommended for localized
or uncomplicated cases of naturally acquired cutaneous anthrax, such as that associated
with exposure to animals with anthrax, or to products such as hides from animals with
anthrax. If susceptibility testing is supportive, oral therapy with penicillin V or amoxicillin may
be used to complete the course of treatment. For severe cases of naturally acquired
cutaneous anthrax with signs of systemic involvement, extensive edema, or lesions of the
head and neck, IV therapy for 7–10 days using ciprofloxacin or doxycycline is preferred; IV
penicillin G, if supported by susceptibility testing, may be used to finish the 7- to 10-day
course. It was considered widely accepted knowledge that penicillin is very effective against
B. anthracis, can render cutaneous lesions culture-negative within 24 hours, and has long
been the treatment of choice in many parts of the world. Therefore, despite reports of
penicillin-resistant isolates and the potential for inducible beta-lactamases, participants
agreed that 7–10 days of penicillin is usually sufficient for treatment of uncomplicated
naturally acquired cutaneous anthrax. However, adequate dosages of penicillins must be
used, patients must be monitored for clinical response, and susceptibility testing must be
conducted to confirm the appropriateness of the antimicrobial choice. Other fluoroquinolones
such as levofloxacin are recommended as additional options for antimicrobial treatment of
naturally acquired cutaneous anthrax.
For bioterrorism (BT)-related cutaneous anthrax, any patient is at risk for IA because of
potential aerosol exposure; the duration of antimicrobial therapy should remain 60 days to
provide a full course of PEP. For localized or uncomplicated cases of BT-related cutaneous
anthrax, oral ciprofloxacin or doxycycline is recommended. Patients with BT-related
cutaneous anthrax with signs of systemic involvement, extensive edema, or lesions of the
head or neck should be treated with IV ciprofloxacin using a multidrug approach, as
previously described for IA and severe disease. Patients may be switched to oral therapy
when clinically appropriate to complete the 60-day regimen; in uncomplicated cases
amoxicillin may be used to complete the regimen if the B. anthracis strain is proven
susceptible (36).
There is insufficient evidence to conclude that the immune response to cutaneous anthrax is
sufficient to justify shortening the 60-day duration of antimicrobial therapy. However, severe
local reactions to anthrax vaccine were reported in 2 vaccine recipients with a previous
history of cutaneous anthrax during a trial of an earlier protective antigen-based anthrax
vaccine (37). For BT-related cutaneous anthrax in patients without a prior history of
cutaneous disease, the recommended regimen should remain 60 days of antimicrobial
therapy plus 3 doses of AVA; for BT-related cutaneous anthrax in patients with a previous
history of cutaneous disease, 60 days of antimicrobial therapy is recommended but vaccine
should not be used because of the risk of adverse events (37).
Immunotherapeutics
Immune globulin of animal origin has been used with some success in the treatment of
human anthrax for many years (34,38), and human-derived anthrax immune globulin (AIG)
was part of the successful treatment of the 2006 IA case-patient under an emergency IND
protocol. (2). Although participants agreed that clinical data are insufficient to develop general
recommendations for the use of AIG and other targeted immunotherapeutics for the
treatment of severe anthrax, they did recommend that CDC continue to offer AIG under
emergency IND on a patient-by-patient basis.
Timing of immune globulin administration is critically important given the small window in
which AIG can be effective as anthrax toxins bind and move intracellularly quickly; early
administration to prevent toxin binding was stressed. However, data on the optimal timing to
initiate immune therapy are lacking. Immunotherapeutics should continue to be considered
for patients with severe systemic illness, for example in patients with evidence of organ
dysfunction in >2 organ systems or lack of clinical response to standard therapy. A high
research priority should be to continue to evaluate immunotherapeutics as they are
developed for inclusion in future recommendations.
Special Populations
Treatment of anthrax during pregnancy should remain the same as for adults because of the
severity of the disease. Ciprofloxacin is recommended as the first-line oral antimicrobial agent
for PEP or treatment of anthrax during pregnancy (39). Doxycycline should not be used for
PEP or treatment during pregnancy unless started in the third trimester. Transition to
amoxicillin for PEP remains recommended when the isolate involved is susceptible to
penicillin.
Although the Department of Defense has published safety data on AVA during pregnancy
(40), the statistical power of the study was limited. Meeting participants indicated that
additional safety data are needed to support appropriate decisions regarding
recommendations for this population. It was proposed that AVA be included in the PEP
protocol for pregnancy if there is strong evidence of risk for IA or if the benefit outweighs
risks from vaccination. Vaccination may also be deferred to immediately postpartum if the
risk of IA persists because of limited safety data on AVA use during pregnancy.
For breastfeeding mothers, if the infant was also exposed, the mother’s antimicrobial regimen
should match the child’s regimen when possible. When not possible, the mother can pump
and discard her breast milk while being treated, and resume breastfeeding after completing
her course of PEP.
Recommendations for treatment of BT-related anthrax in pediatric patients should be
consistent with adult antimicrobial agents, with ciprofloxacin favored for severe disease.
Ciprofloxacin or doxycycline is recommended as the first-line oral antimicrobial agent for PEP.
Amoxicillin is recommended as an alternative in pediatric treatment when the isolate involved
is susceptible to penicillin. Participants discussed the need to determine the appropriate
amoxicillin PEP dose for pediatric patients to resolve differences between CDC and FDA
recommendations. The consensus was that the amoxicillin PEP dose should err on the higher
end in favor of ensuring efficacy. Data are lacking on the safety of long-term use of high-
dosage amoxicillin in pediatric patients; participants recommended additional research and
Pediatric Advisory Committee input to determine the most appropriate pediatric amoxicillin
PEP dosage. Currently, anthrax vaccination cannot be recommended for use in children
because safety and efficacy data are lacking.
Finally, for special populations such as geriatric patients or patients with special medical
conditions, standard medical practice should prevail. Physicians should perform standard
medical screening for potential drug interactions and for underlying diseases such as renal
failure before initiating treatment or PEP; drug selection and dosage should be adjusted
accordingly.
Research into the evaluation, prevention, and therapy of anthrax is ongoing, and CDC
guidelines for anthrax are subject to change based on new information and expert
recommendation. When available, updated CDC guidelines for treatment and prophylaxis of
anthrax will be published in detail in other CDC publications.
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